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De jure judicial independence (JI) is the single most important predictor of de facto JI. 
In this paper, we describe under what conditions countries are likely to include JI in 
their constitutions. We describe and analyze both their original choice in this regard as 
well as change over time using a newly constructed dataset comprised of 100 countries 
and covering the years between 1950 and 2005. Three results stand out. First, legal 
origins  do  have  an  impact  on  the  likelihood  of  explicitly  anchoring  JI  in  the 
constitution:  countries  belonging  to  the  common  law  tradition  are  less  likely  to 
implement JI in their constitutions (and those with a socialist tradition are more likely 
to  do  so).  Correspondingly,  former  British  colonies  are  less  likely  to  address  JI 
explicitly as are states in the Caribbean. Second, religion has a significant impact on 
whether  JI  is  included  in  the  constitution:  societies  experiencing  a  high  level  of 
religious fractionalization are not only less likely to anchor JI in their constitutions, but 
are also  less likely to  change their  constitutions  in  that direction later  on. Finally, 
Muslim countries are more likely to include mention of JI, whereas Protestant countries 
are  less  likely  to  do  so.  Third,  the  distribution  of  resources  within  societies  has 
important—and  largely  unexpected—effects:  a  higher  percentage  of  family  farms,  a 
wider  distribution  of  education,  and  a  higher  percentage  of  urban  dwellers  are  all 
connected with a lower likelihood of JI being mentioned in the constitution. 
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Mapping Constitutionally Safeguarded Judicial Independence—A Global Survey 
1 Introduction 
Research into both the consequences and the causes of judicial independence (JI) has 
made steady progress over the last several years. For example, in 2002, Burbank and 
Friedman  (2002,  9)  could  claim  that  ―[j]udicial  independence  exists  primarily  as  a 
rhetorical notion rather  than as  a subject  of sustained, organized study.‖  In another 
contribution to that same volume, Jennings Peretti (2002, 122) wrote: ―We need precise 
measures  of  judicial  independence  and  research  that  then  tests  its  causes  and 
consequences. For example, we cannot simply assume that tenure and salary protections 
guarantee judicial independence.‖ 
Since then, there has been substantial progress in the field. Various indicators to make JI 
measurable  have  been  proposed  and  it  has  been  shown  that  de  facto  JI  is  robustly 
correlated  with  economic  growth  (Feld  and  Voigt  2003).  Yet,  wide  gaps  in  our 
knowledge  remain.  This  paper  aims  at  narrowing  two  of  them:  (1)  the  role  that 
constitutions play in safeguarding JI, and (2) how safeguarding JI has changed over 
time. 
To  achieve  this,  we  document  the  ways  23  aspects  of  JI  are  safeguarded  in  the 
constitutional  documents  of  as  many  as  100  countries.  To  see  whether  important 
changes have occurred over time, we code constitutions on an annual basis between 
1950 (or the first year of a country’s independence) and 2005. 
Whereas research shows that de jure JI—such as that guaranteed in the constitution—
bears only little resemblance to de facto JI, de jure JI is still the single most important 
determinant  of  de  facto  JI  (Hayo  and  Voigt  2007).  The  newly  assembled  dataset 
described in this paper can be used to determine the consequences of constitutionally 
safeguarded JI and, in particular, the consequences of changes in its protection over 
time. 
In  this  paper,  we  describe  how  constitutions  have  evolved.  We  are  particularly 
interested  in  illustrating  long-term  trends  in  the  ways  JI  is  safeguarded  via  the 
constitution. For instance, it has often been claimed that judicial review experienced a 
triumphal ascension after WW II (Ginsburg 2008 is a recent survey). It has also been 
suggested that the degree of JI might be correlated with the degree of democracy, or 
with per capita income, or with legal origins, and so forth. Our new database allows us 
to test all these claims. 
Three  results  stand  out.  First,  legal  origins  do  have  an  impact  on  the  likelihood  of 
explicitly  anchoring  JI  in  the  constitution:  countries  belonging  to  the  common  law   3 
tradition are less likely to implement JI in their constitutions (and those with a socialist 
tradition are more likely to do so). Correspondingly, former British colonies are less 
likely to address JI explicitly as are states in the Caribbean. Second, religion has  a 
significant impact on whether JI is included in the constitution: societies experiencing a 
high level of religious fractionalization are not only less likely to anchor JI in their 
constitutions, but are also less likely to change their constitutions in that direction later 
on.  Finally,  Muslim  countries  are  more  likely  to  include  mention  of  JI,  whereas 
Protestant countries are less likely to do so. Third, the distribution of resources within 
societies has important—and largely unexpected—effects: a higher percentage of family 
farms, a wider distribution of education, and a higher percentage of urban dwellers are 
all connected with a lower likelihood of JI being mentioned in the constitution. 
The  rest  of  this  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  reiterates  a  number  of 
conjectures for the purported relevance of JI. In Section 3, the newly assembled dataset 
is described in detail. Section 4 contains our analysis of the data; Section 5 concludes. 
2 Some Conjectures 
An independent judiciary is one means of solving the dilemma of the strong state. This 
dilemma, briefly, is that on the one hand, a state must be strong enough to protect 
private property rights; on the other hand, a state powerful enough to protect private 
property rights is also powerful enough to attenuate or completely disregard private 
property rights. Such a situation benefits no one. Citizens, who anticipate that their 
property  rights  may  not  be  respected  have  less  incentive  to  create  wealth.  The 
government, for its part, will receive lower tax income and will have to pay higher 
interest rates as a debtor. A state’s formal strength thus turns into factual weakness. A 
judiciary that can adjudicate between state and citizens without any interference from 
the government can reduce this dilemma. If the judiciary is a neutral arbiter and its 
decisions are systematically implemented by the other government branches, aggregate 
investment will rise and the economy will grow more quickly. Thus, in principle, the 
judiciary is an institutional arrangement that solves the dilemma of the strong state. An 
independent  judiciary  is,  in  other  words,  a  precommitment  device  that  can  turn 
government promises to respect private property rights into credible commitments. 
JI  implies  that  judges  can  expect  their  decisions  to  be  implemented  regardless  of 
whether such decisions are in the interests of other government branches upon which 
the  actual  implementation  depends.  It  further  implies  that  judges—apart  from  their 
decisions  not  being  implemented—are  not  subject  to  negative  consequences  as  the 
result of their decisions, such as (a) being dismissed, (b) being paid less, or (c) losing   4 
influence.  Three  archetypical  situations  in  which  the  independent  judiciary  plays  a 
crucial role can be distinguished: 
(1) In cases of conflict between private parties: if one of the parties to a voluntary 
contract believes that the other side has not fulfilled its obligations, impartial dispute 
resolution can be important. As long as both sides expect the judiciary to be impartial 
and hence immune from pressure by either of the contract partners or any other party, 
they can save on transaction costs while negotiating their contract. In general, lower 
transaction costs lead to more welfare-enhancing transactions. 
(2) In cases of conflict between government and citizens, the latter need an entity that 
can  adjudicate  who  is  in  the  right  (i.e.,  who  has  acted  according  to  the  law).  The 
judiciary performs this task as it helps ensure that the government is under the rule of 
law. This means not only that the judiciary ascertains whether newly passed legislation 
is  constitutional,  but  that  it  also  checks  whether  representatives  of  the  state  have 
followed the procedural devices intended to safeguard the rule of law. 
(3) In cases of conflict between various branches of the government: in the absence of 
an impartial arbiter, conflicts between government branches are most likely to develop 
into power games. An independent judiciary can keep these bodies ―inside the lines‖ of 
the constitution and prevent resources being wasted. 
Constitutional Provisions to Safeguard Judicial Independence 
How can JI be formally safeguarded? The independence of judges relies on the stability 
of the set of provisions within which they operate. The stability of court powers and 
procedures  depends  on  how  difficult  it  is  to  change  them.  Powers  and  procedures 
explicitly  spelled  out  in  the  constitution  are  often  entrenched  and  more  difficult  to 
change than ordinary legislation. Moreover, by making specific powers and procedures 
part of the constitution, the constitutional assembly signals that it attributes a particular 
importance to them. This is why we restrict our analysis to constitutionally safeguarded 
JI. The implication of our approach is that the dataset presented here does not allow 
making any general statements about the development of de facto JI over time. The 
decision to concentrate on constitutionally safeguarded JI does not necessarily imply 
that such is better protected than JI safeguarded either by ordinary legislation or even 
informal conventions. Ex ante, we cannot exclude the possibility that constitutionally 
entrenched  rules  that  are  very  costly  to  change  suffer  from  a  higher  likelihood  of 
becoming factually obsolete than ordinary legislation that can be modified at lower cost. 
The  appointment  procedure  for  judges  may  have  a  notable  effect  on  the  court’s 
independence. As JI is, inter alia, intended to protect citizens from the illegitimate use   5 
of power by other government branches, as well as to settle disputes between branches 
of government, it ought to be as independent as possible from the influence of these 
other  branches.  We  hypothesize  that  the  most  independent  procedure  of  judicial 
appointment  is  that  undertaken  by  professionals  (other  judges  or  jurists).  The  least 
independent method is appointment by one powerful politician (e.g., prime minister or 
minister of justice). 
Judicial tenure is crucial to the independence of the judiciary. We assume that judges 
are  especially  independent  when  they  are  appointed  for  life  (or  up  to  a  mandatory 
retirement age) and cannot be removed from office, save by legal procedure. Judges are 
less independent if their terms are renewable because they have an incentive to please 
those who reappoint them. 
Further,  giving  member  of  other  branches  of  government  the  power  to  set  judges’ 
salaries gives judges an incentive to take the preferences of these members explicitly 
into account. General rules that judges’ salary cannot be reduced increase JI. There are 
at  least  three  ways  this  can  be  done,  namely,  safeguarding  nominal  salaries,  real 
salaries, or relative salaries. The first possibility offers little protection in an inflationary 
environment  or over longer time periods. The  second possibility ensures  a  constant 
absolute living standard, but could be detrimental to judges’ social position in a high-
growth economy. Finally, protecting the relative income position of judges over time 
protects their social position but does not insure a specific living standard. 
Another component of judicial independence is the accessibility of the court and its 
ability to initiate proceedings. A court that is accessible only by executive or legislative 
officials will be less independent than a court accessible by every citizen claiming that 
his or her rights have been violated. 
If the allocation of cases to members of the court is at the discretion of the chief justice, 
his or her influence will be substantially greater than that of other members of the court. 
Such  an  institutional  environment  creates  incentives  to  bribe  the  chief  justice.  We 
expect independence to be greater if there is a general rule according to which cases are 
allocated to specific judges. 
The  competencies  assigned  to  the  constitutional  court  do  not  directly  affect  its 
independence. Yet, the highest courts must have a minimum number of competencies in 
order to act as a check on other government branches. If the constitution is interpreted 
as the most basic formal layer of rules restraining (and enabling) government, then it is 
crucial that the court have the power to decide whether legislation conforms to the 
constitution. This is sometimes called the power of constitutional or judicial review.   6 
If courts are required to publish their decisions, such decisions can become subject to 
public debate, which increases the incentive for judges to present coherent and legally 
convincing  arguments,  thereby  making  it  more  difficult  for  representatives  of  other 
government branches to influence decisions. Transparency will be even higher if the 
courts also publish dissenting opinions based on forceful legal arguments. 
3 Description of the New Database 
The  Comparative  Constitutions  Project  (Elkins  et  al.  2009)  contains  75  variables 
dealing with many aspects of the judiciary. We choose 23 variables that we believe are 
particularly  relevant  to  how  JI  is  safeguarded  by  constitutional  provisions.  The 
discussion in Section 2 serves as the basis for choosing the variables. 
A first indication of the importance of JI is its explicit mention in the constitution. 
Consequently, we create a dummy variable determining whether the independence of 
central judicial organs is explicitly stated in the constitution (JUDIND). This variable is 
analyzed in greater detail in Section 4. 
Appointment Procedure 
Those with  the power to  nominate and/or appoint judges  may  be able to  indirectly 
influence  court  decisions,  for  example,  by  appointing  judges  who  have  preferences 
similar  to  their  own.  Our  first  variable  in  this  group  simply  indicates  whether  the 
process used to select judges of the highest ordinary court is specified in the constitution 
(HOCCJ). 
Next  we  code  those  involved  in  nominating  candidates  for  two  different  positions, 
namely: (1) the chief justice of the highest ordinary court (CHIEFNOM) and (2) the 
judges of the highest ordinary court (SUPNOM). 
Actors involved in the nomination process can be considered as agenda setters for those 
who  have  the  actual  authority  to  make  the  appointments.  Correspondingly,  two 
variables deal with the identities of those who make the decisions within the given 
agenda, that is, those involved in approving nominations for (1) the chief of the highest 
ordinary court (CHIEFAP) and (2) the judges of the highest ordinary court (SUPAP). 
In  this  paper,  we  use  these  variables  primarily  to  identify  the  different  ways  of 
appointing judges at the constitutional level and their development over time. Providing 
systematic information for a large number of countries over time closes a significant 
gap in the literature. However, the database has also been compiled with a view to 
further research. For instance, it is possible to code variations of independence. One 
could  combine  the  nomination  and  approval  variables  and  code  this  aspect  of   7 
constitutionally safeguarded JI as low if a single person from the executive branch has 
the  power  to  both  nominate  and  approve  a  judicial  candidate.  We  leave  such 
possibilities to future research. 
Judicial Tenure 
The basic idea is that longer tenure implies more independence. We inquire into the 
maximum term length of three positions (chief judge [CHFTERM] and other members 
of the highest ordinary court [SUPTERM]. Additionally, we ask whether there are any 
term length restrictions (e.g., only one term allowed or no successive terms). We do this 
for the two judicial positions that are our focus, namely, the chief justice of the highest 
ordinary court (CHFTRMINM) and the other justices of that court (SUPTERMN). 
The possibility of removing a judge from office before expiration of the term of duty is 
another important dimension determining the level of JI. We look at three aspects of 
removal, namely, whether there are any provisions for dismissing judges (JREM) and, if 
yes,  under  what  conditions  judges  can  be  dismissed  (JREMCON)  and  who  has  the 
power to suggest the dismissal of judges (JREMPRO). 
Judicial Salaries 
An effective way of limiting JI is to reduce the salary of judges. We therefore ask 
whether  the  constitution  explicitly  protects  judicial  salaries  from  government 
intervention (JUDSAL). More refined notions of salary protection as discussed above 
are unlikely to be found at the constitutional level. 
Judicial Review 
Some authors explicitly distinguish between JI and judicial review (e.g., La Porta et al. 
2004). Since we are interested in a broad view of JI, we prefer to consider judicial 
review as simply one dimension of it. If an independent judiciary is considered to be a 
specific  device  for  making  government  commitments  credible,  then  judicial  review 
appears to be an important aspect of that function: allowing a government to easily 
change  legislation  would  result  in  a  large  loss  of  credibility.  To  make  government 
promises credible, a reliable legal framework is necessary. Judicial review gives courts 
the  power  to  monitor  the  compatibility  between  (newly  passed)  legislation  and 
fundamental judicial principles as laid down in the constitution. 
Legal systems can allocate the power of judicial review to different courts. Every court 
could be granted this competence or it could be restricted to a special court, such as the 
constitutional  court  (INTERP).  Further,  courts  themselves  are  almost  never  agenda   8 
setters. So it is interesting to know more about which official entities have the authority 
to ask courts to review the constitutionality of a piece of legislation (CHALLEG). 
There are various models of judicial review. In some countries, it can occur only prior 
to the promulgation of a law; in other countries, it is the exact opposite. We include a 
variable that records at which stage of the legislative process bills can be reviewed for 
constitutionality (CHALSTAG). Our conjecture is that the judiciary is most independent 
from other branches of government if it has the power to review the constitutionality of 
statutes both before and after their promulgation. Further, there are different ways of 
dealing with laws that have been deemed unconstitutional: they can be voided in their 
entirety, they can be declared void only under certain conditions, and so on. This issue 
is  covered  by  the  variable  CHALUNCON.  Arguably,  the  judiciary  is  particularly 
independent if its decision automatically makes the law void (not only for the specific 
case at hand or after parliament has passed a new law overturning the old one). 
Further,  and  going  beyond  the  power  of  judicial  review,  we  are  interested  in  the 
competencies the highest ordinary court has other than reviewing legislation; including, 
for example, the supervision of elections, the impeachment of the executive, deciding 
on the constitutionality of political parties, and so forth (SUPPOW). Ex ante, the net 
effects of such competencies are unclear: on the one hand, granting the judiciary could 
increase  its  power  and  influence;  on  the  other  hand,  however,  if,  due  to  such 
responsibilities, the court becomes drawn into highly disputed terrain, its reputation—
and  particularly  its  reputation  for  independence—could  suffer.  This  variable 
additionally allows us to identify whether there is a trend away from (or toward) the 
core functions of the judiciary. 
Publication of Decisions 
Regarding  publication  of  court  decisions,  we  inquire  into  two  aspects,  namely:  (i) 
whether the constitution provides for the publication of judicial opinions of the highest 
ordinary  court  (HOCOP)  and  (ii)  whether  reasons  for  decisions  are  constitutionally 
required and dissenting opinions allowed (HOCOPW). If the court is required to publish 
its  opinions,  transparency  of  its  decision  making  is  expected  to  increase.  Hence, 
published opinions are expected to improve the reputation of the court, which, in turn, 
increases its de facto power as an independent political actor. The effect is expected to 
be even stronger if reasons for the opinions are given and dissenting opinions allowed. 
However, if dissenting opinions occur regularly and by more than one judge, public 
trust in legal decision making may be weakened. 
To summarize, we have included all variables in Table 1.   9 
Table 1: Overview over all variables used 
Variable  Description 
Judicial Independence Explicitly Mentioned? 
1. JUDIND  Does the constitution contain an explicit declaration regarding 
the independence of the central judicial organ(s)? 
Appointment Procedure 
2. HOCCJ  Is the selection process specified for the chief justice or the other 
justices of the Highest Ordinary Court? 
3/4.  CHIEFNOM  / 
SUPNOM 
Who is involved in the nomination of the Chief Justice (/judges) 
of the Highest Ordinary Court? 
5/6.  CHIEFAP  / 
SUPAP 
Who is involved in the approval of nominations for the Chief 
Justice (/judges) of the Highest Ordinary Court? 
Judicial Tenure 
7/8.  CHFTERM  / 
SUPTERM 
What is the maximum term length for the Chief Justice (/judges) 
of the Highest Ordinary Court? 
9/10. CHFTRMNM / 
SUPTERMN 
What restrictions are in place regarding the number of terms for 
the Chief Justice (/judges) of the Highest Ordinary Court? 
11. JREM  Are there provisions for dismissing judges? 
12. JREMCON  Under what conditions can judges be dismissed? 
13. JREMPRO  Who can propose the dismissal of judges? 
Judicial Salaries 
14. JUDSAL  Does  the  constitution  explicitly  state  that  judicial  salaries  are 
protected from governmental intervention? 
Judicial Review 
15. INTERP  To whom does the constitution assign the responsibility for the 
interpretation of the constitution? 
16. CHALLEG  Who has standing to initiate challenge to the constitutionality of 
legislation? 
17. CHALSTAG  At what stage of the legislative process can bills be reviewed for 
constitutionality? 
18. CHALUNCN  What is the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality? 
Publication Requirements 
19. HOCOP  Does  the  constitution  provide  for  judicial  opinions  of  the 
Highest Ordinary Court? 
20. HOCOPW  Which  of  the  following  is  mentioned  about  opinions  for  the 
Highest Ordinary Court? 
Additional Powers 
21. SUPPOW  What  additional  powers  does  the  highest  ordinary  court  have 
besides reviewing legislation? 
4. Analysis of the Data 
In this section, we restrict ourselves to analyzing just one of the 23 variables described 
in Section 3—whether the independence of the judiciary is explicitly mentioned in the 
constitution.  After  briefly  describing  the  underlying  dataset,  we  proceed  to  first 
investigate the bivariate correlation of explicit mention of JI in the constitution with a 
number of potentially interesting other variables and, second, look at the correlation 
between change in the JI variable and the other variables.   10 
4.1 Our Dataset 
Our analysis is based on a sample of 100 countries over the period 1950 to 2005. If the 
country under investigation became independent after 1950, we begin coding with the 
first year for which that country had its own constitution. The data cover a diverse group 
of countries with regard to geographic area, size, age, religious background, and state of 
economic development. 
Table 2: Selection of Countries 
Country  First year of 
constitution 
Country  First year of 
constitution 
Country  First year of 
constitution 
Albania  1950  El Salvador  1950  Niger  1960 
Andorra 













Argentina  1950  Ethiopia  1950  Panama  1950 
Armenia  1995  France  1950  Paraguay  1950 
Australia  1950  Gambia  1970  Peru  1950 
Austria  1950  Georgia  1995  Poland  1950 
Azerbaijan  1995  Germany  1950  Portugal  1950 
Bahamas  1973  Ghana  1957  Romania  1991 
Bangladesh  1972  Greece  1952  Singapore  1965 
Barbados  1966  Grenada  1974  Slovakia  1992 
Belarus  1994  Guatemala  1950  Slovenia  1991 
Belgium  1950  Guinea  1958  Spain  1950 














Brazil  1950  Iceland  1950  Sweden  1950 
Bulgaria  1950  India  1950  Syria  1950 
Cameroon  1961  Indonesia  1950  Taiwan  1950 
Canada  1950  Ireland  1950  Tajikistan  1994 
Chile  1950  Italy  1950  Thailand  1950 














Congo  1961  Kyrgyzstan  1993  Ukraine  1996 
Cuba  1950  Latvia  1991  United States  1950 
Cyprus  1960  Lebanon  1950  Uruguay  1950 
Czech Republic  1992  Lithuania  1992  Uzbekistan  1992 
Denmark  1950  Luxembourg  1950  Venezuela  1950 








Ecuador  1950  Netherlands  1950     
Egypt  1950  Nicaragua  1950     
Note: Yemen comprises the Republic of North Yemen and the Arab Republic of Yemen (first year of 
constitution: 1990), as both constitutions contain a declaration on judicial independence.   11 
In 2005, 81 countries mention JI in their constitutions, which is a clear majority; 19 
countries  do  not.  We  observe  constitutional  change,  i.e.,  a  change  regarding 
constitutional JI in an existing constitution, in 15 countries. Of those that changed their 
constitutions, 12 countries added specific references to JI over time (Belgium (1998), 
Canada  (1960),  Ecuador  (1967),  Equatorial  Guinea  (1982),  Ethiopia  (1955),  Ghana 
(1969), Greece (1975), Indonesia (2001), Nigeria (1963), Peru (1979), Portugal (1976), 
and Sri Lanka (1972)). China removed constitutional JI temporarily between 1975 and 
1982, as did Congo between 1969 and 1992 and Venezuela between 1953 and 1961. 
Thus, there has been a clear, if slow, trend toward anchoring JI in existing constitutions. 
As shown in Table 3, constitutional change takes place in all decades. 
Table 3: Number of Countries Changing Constitutional Base of Judicial Independence  
  1950s  1960s  1970s  1980s  1990s  2000s 
Number of Changes  2  6  5  2  2  1 
However, during the time period under investigation, new states were formed and new 
constitutions were drafted. A number of new states in the third world were created 
during the 1960s and 1970s and the fall of the Iron Curtain resulted in a surge of 
constitutional activity by transformation countries in the 1990s, particularly in Eastern 
Europe. Nevertheless, as reported in Table  4, half of the countries in our sample had 
their constitution in place before 1950. 
Table 4: Age of Constitutions, Constitutional Change, and Judicial Independence 
Age of Constitution  JI in Constitution  JI Not in Constitution  Number (%) Implementing JI 
Permanently 
1950 and earlier  33 (66%)  9 (18%)  8 (16%) 
1951–1960  4 (57%)  0  3 (43%) 
1961–1970  9 (64%)  4 (29%)  1 (7%) 
1971–1980  2 (33%)  4 (67%)  0 
1981–1990  2 (50%)  2 (50%)  0 
1991–2000  19 (100%)  0  0 
2000–2005  0  0  0 
Total number  69  19  12 
In 1950, the starting year of our sample,  33 countries (66%) had a constitution that 
included a declaration of JI;  17  countries (34%) did not. Of these  17,  eight  (47%) 
implemented  constitutional  JI.  In  contrast,  only  very  few  of  the  more  recent 
constitutions have been changed. In the period 1951–1990, 31 new constitutions came 
into force but only 55% of them contained a reference to JI. A great increase in new 
constitutions  occurred  in  the  1990s  due  to  the  transformation  of  former  communist 
countries. It is notable that all these constitutions include a declaration on JI. 
The explicit mention of JI in constitutions has thus occurred in waves: constitutions 
enacted before 1950 were likely to include it (p = 0.66), constitutions passed between 
1951 and 1990 were not as likely to include it (p = 0.55), and constitutions promulgated 
after 1990 were certain to include it (p = 1.00). The literature often gives the impression   12 
that after WW II there was a quasi-linear trend toward more JI; however, the data do not 
support this presumption. 
The age of a constitution may be an important explanatory variable for the probability 
of explicitly mentioning JI. The drafting of younger constitutions is based on a greater 
pool  of  knowledge  and  experience  (i.e.,  that  of  other  countries)  and  so  these 
constitutions are less likely the result of trial and error. However, when we correlate age 
of  the  constitution  with  JI,  we  find  a  positive,  albeit  not  significant,  correlation 
coefficient  of  0.11.  Thus,  the  data  do  not  provide  much  support  for  the  ―age‖ 
hypothesis. Age of constitution may also affect the likelihood of constitutional change. 
Older constitutions may be more in need of change than younger constitutions, but it is 
also possible that necessary adjustments were already been made before 1950, the start 
of our investigation period. The correlation is -0.26, significant at the 5% level, which 
implies that older constitutions are more likely to be modified. However, refining the 
analysis reveals that this relationship is negative but not significant when focusing on 
the 19 Western states, whereas it is 0.28 and significant at the 5% level for the other 81 
countries. Thus, it is primarily old constitutions from the non-Western world that are 
subject to adjustment. 
4.2 Bivariate Correlations 
In this section, we investigate the bivariate correlations of our JI variable with other 
variables  so  as  to  better  understand  whether  certain  ways  of  safeguarding  JI 
constitutionally depend on geographic location, history, constitutional context, the court 
model in a given country, and so forth. 
4.2.1 Geography 
The various dimensions of geography are exogenous. It has been noted that distance 
from the equator is a good predictor of the quality of a country’s institutions, as well as 
of its per capita income (Hall and Jones 1999). It is interesting to see whether regional 
influences affect the likelihood of including a declaration on JI in the constitution. We 
start by analyzing correlations based on the ―original‖ constitution, that is, we ignore 
constitutional change. In a second step, we study the occurrence of such change. The 
first analysis is based on 85 countries, the second on 15. 
Drawing  on  the  absolute  distance  from  the  equator  (i.e.,  latitude),  we  find  that  the 
correlation  coefficient  between  this  geographical  indicator  and  JI  as  originally 
implemented  in  the  constitution  is  0.03,  which  is  not  significant.  Thus,  there  is  no 
statistically  reliable  association  between  absolute  distance  from  the  equator  and  a 
constitutional declaration of JI.   13 
Instead of relying exclusively on a purely geographical definition of regions, it may be 
informative  to  take  into  account  cultural,  social,  economic,  and  political  closeness. 
Table  5  divides  our  sample  countries  into  seven  regional  groups  and  assesses  their 
relationship with constitutionally safeguarded JI. 
Table 5: Regions and Declaration of JI in the Constitution  
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Note: Testing actual vs. expected frequencies: Pearson Chi
2(6) = 43.3 [marginal level of significance: 
0.0001]. 
In most regions, a majority of original constitutions contains a reference to JI and all 
states in our sample from Eastern Europe, MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa do. The 
exception is the group of Caribbean states, the constitutions of which rarely address JI 
explicitly.1  The Western states  are  about  evenly split between including JI in the 
constitution and not. Testing statistically, we can easily reject the hypothesis of a 
random allocation of numbers to the cells. Noteworthy is the positive association of JI 
with Eastern European countries (Pearson correlation  coefficient: 0.31) as well as the 
negative relation with Caribbean countries (Pearson correlation coefficient: –0.59), both 
significant at a 1% level. The correlation coefficient of the Western states is -0.27 and 
significant at a 5% level. 
History shows that access to the sea can be an important determinant of a country’s 
development.  Of  the  19  landlocked  countries  in  our  sample,  18  (95%)  originally 
implemented JI in their constitutions, whereas only 48 (73%) of the 66 countries with 
access  to  the  sea  have  done  so.  At  a  significance  level  of  5%,  we  can  reject  the 
hypothesis that this is a random distribution. Thus, landlocked countries are more likely 
to  anchor JI in  their  constitutions. Landlocked  countries  suffer  from  a  geographical 
disadvantage  in  comparison  to  non-landlocked  ones.  It  could  thus  be  that  their 
constitutional assemblies try to choose better quality institutions to make up for the 
geographical disadvantage. We suspect, however, that this correlation is more formal 
than real: the partial correlation between being a landlocked country and the quality of 
government (operationalized, e.g., by the government effectiveness indicator provided 
                                                 
1  One possible explanation is that many former British colonies accepted the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council as their highest court of appeal even after gaining independence. For countries 
that did so, constitutionally guaranteeing judicial independence might thus not have appeared as an 
important issue (on the relevance of this court for the economic development of former colonies, 
see Voigt et al. (2007)).   14 
by the World Bank) is rather low (with the negative correlation being significant at least 
on the 5% level). 
Next, we study how these three regional dimensions relate to constitutional change in JI. 
There is a correlation coefficient of –0.21 between absolute latitude and constitutional 
change, which is significant at the 5% level. Hence, the farther away countries are from 
the equator, the less likely it is that they will change their constitution with respect to JI.  
Table 6 reports the relevant frequencies after dividing the countries into the regions 
outlined above. 
Table 6: Regions and Changes in the Declaration of JI in the Constitution 
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Note: Testing actual vs. expected frequencies: Pearson Chi
2(6) = 12.0 [marginal level of significance: 
0.062]. 
Constitutional  change  occurs  relatively  frequently  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  and  Asia, 
whereas there is no change in the original constitutions of Eastern European, MENA, 
and  Caribbean  countries.  There  is  a  negative  correlation  between  East  European 
countries and constitutional change with a coefficient of -0.22 and a positive correlation 
between Sub-Saharan Africa and constitutional change with a coefficient of 0.20, both 
significant at a 5% level. 
Considering  whether  countries  are  landlocked  does  not  help  explain  constitutional 
change. Of the 20 landlocked countries, only one experienced JI-related changes in the 
constitution, whereas this is the case for 14 out of the 80 countries with access to the 
sea. The correlation coefficient is –0.14, that is, landlocked countries are less likely to 
change their constitutions, but the probability of doing so is not statistically significant. 
4.2.2 History 
Colonial history can leave a deep imprint on a country’s development. Quite often, 
current  political,  economic,  and  legal  institutions  are  heavily  influenced  by  those 
prevalent when the country was a colony. Table 7 cross-tabulates explicit inclusion of JI 
in the constitution and colonial history. In our sample, about 40% of the countries were 
never a colony. Of those that have a colonial history, most were governed either by 
Great  Britain  (22)  or  Spain  (14);  there  are  only  few  cases  of  former  French  and 
Portuguese colonies. 
   15 
Table 7: Colonial History and Declaration of JI in the Constitution 
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Note: Testing actual vs. expected frequencies: Pearson Chi
2(4) = 10.6 [marginal level of significance: 
0.031]. 
There  is  significant  statistical  evidence  that  colonial  history  and  constitutionally 
safeguarded JI are related. Under a random process, we would expect a significantly 
larger number of former British colonies to include JI in their constitutions. Specifically, 
the correlation coefficient in this case is –0.33, which is significant at a 1% level. Thus, 
those  countries  that  are  former  British  colonies  have  a  much  lower  probability  of 
implementing  constitutional  references  to  JI.  We  can  only  speculate  about  possible 
reasons  for  this  result:  one  reason  might  be  the  British  tradition  of  an  unwritten 
constitution. 
In Table 8, we analyze whether colonial history affects the likelihood of constitutional 
change as to JI. 
Table 8: Colonial History and Changes in the Declaration of JI in the Constitution 



































Note: Testing actual vs. expected frequencies: Pearson Chi
2(4) = 1.4 [marginal level of significance: 
0.850]. 
Statistically, we find  no significant  evidence that  constitutional  change and colonial 
history  are  related.  We  therefore  conclude  that  constitutional  change  is  not  notably 
influenced by colonial history. 
Legal origin is often considered a forceful determinant of a country’s legal environment. 
La  Porta  et  al.  (1998,  1999)  distinguish  between  common  law  and  civil  law.  They 
further distinguish civil law between French, Scandinavian, German, and Socialist law, 
and find that the legal origin of commercial law is also a good predictor for the quality 
of  institutions.  It  is  somewhat  open  to  question  whether  the  origin  of  a  country’s 
commercial law will have any bearing on its de jure degree of JI, which is an element of 
public law, but the papers by La Porta et al. are very influential and we thus explicitly 
take into account the possible effects of legal origin. Table 9 cross-tabulates legal origin 
with the declaration of JI in the constitution, as well as with change of an existing 
constitution.   16 
Table 9: Legal Origin, Declarations of JI in Constitution, and Constitutional Change 
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Note: Testing actual vs. expected frequencies: Pearson Chi
2(8) = 27.7 [marginal level of significance: 
0.001]. 
In our sample, most constitutions have a French legal origin (42), followed by those 
based in the common law (32), Socialist (18), and German/Scandinavian (8) traditions. 
Three results are particularly noteworthy. Constitutions in common law countries and 
Scandinavian countries are less likely to mention JI explicitly in their constitutions. 
Socialist constitutions, on the other hand, are very likely to mention JI. We again can 
reject  the  hypothesis  that  the  numbers  in  the  cells  are  randomly  distributed  at  any 
reasonable level of significance. In particular, we would expect to see more countries 
with  a  common  law  origin  (Pearson  correlation  coefficient:  –0.36)  and  more 
Scandinavian  countries  (Pearson  correlation  coefficient:  –0.28)  having  JI  in  their 
constitution.  Less  Socialist  constitutions  should  have  JI  implemented  (Pearson 
correlation  coefficient:  0.27).  The  probability  of  constitutional  change  seems  to  be 
unaffected by legal origins. 
Ethnolinguistic  fractionalization  has  been  a  standard  control  for  economic  growth 
models ever since Easterly and Levine (1997) showed that this variable explains much 
of the variation in African country growth rates. It is also used to explain the quality of 
institutions.  A  population  highly  fractionalized  on  ethnic  grounds  and  possibly  also 
language-diverse  might  be  more  prone  to  internal  conflict.  In  such  a  situation,  the 
conflict-resolving capacities of the judiciary could be particularly important. 
Most studies using ethnolinguistic fractionalization rely on data provided by a Soviet 
institute in the 1960s or on data averaged from several studies. Alesina et al. (2002) 
recalculate  three  fractionalization  indices  in  which  they  distinguish  very  carefully 
between  three  dimensions  of  fractionalization  that  previously  tended  to  be  mixed 
together,  namely,  ethnic,  linguistic,  and  religious  fractionalization.  Because  their 
fractionalization data are computed for a far larger number of countries than is the case 
in previous studies, we rely on their data.2 
                                                 
2  Of late, there has been a discussion whether “fractionalization” or “polarization” is the more 
adequate variable: fractionalization reaches its maximum if each member of society makes up his or 
her own group, whereas polarization reaches its maximum if there are two groups of identical size.   17 
We study the impact of ethnic diversity on JI as it appears in the original constitution. 
The correlation coefficient is 0.27, which is positive and statistically significant at a 5% 
level. Further, the correlation between implemented JI and diversity of languages within 
a society is 0.24, which is also significant at a 5% level. Finally, regarding religious 
diversity, we find a correlation coefficient of –0.26, which is significant at the 5% level. 
Hence, we find significant evidence that diversity in language and ethnicity increases 
the likelihood of constitutionally safeguarded JI but also that constitutionally guaranteed 
JI  is  less  likely  to  occur  in  ―original‖  constitutions  in  societies  that  are  religiously 
fractionalized.3 These results show that ethnolinguistic fractionalization should, indeed, 
be disentangled and its three components should be taken into account separately.  The 
finding itself is certainly puzzling and we can only speculate abo ut possible reasons: 
constitutionally safeguarded JI is a way of delegating decision -making power to a 
branch that does usually not enjoy direct democratic legitimation. All three aspects of 
diversity are closely correlated with very basic issues of identi ty. But it might be the 
case that religious issues are most intimately concerned with notions of truth. If such 
very basic matters are at stake, people might be less willing to delegate competences 
than with regard to more technical issues. 
Analyzing constitutional amendments with regard to JI, the correlation between ethnic 
diversity and change is 0.24 and significant at a 5% level. Those countries that are more 
fractured along ethnic lines will be more likely to implement constitutional change. 
More language diversity also makes constitutional change regarding JI more likely; the 
correlation coefficient is 0.09, but not significant. Finally, greater religious diversity 
makes constitutional amendment less likely. The correlation is  –0.10, but it is also not 
significant.4 Thus, the most important dimension of fractionalization for safeguarding JI 
in the constitution is linked to ethnic diversity. Societies with more ethnic diversity are 
more likely to implement JI and more likely to change their constitution with regard to 
adjusting formal JI. 
                                                                                                                                      
Those who argue in favor of using polarization (Estaban and Rey 1994; Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol 2002) argue that chances of impasse and instability are higher under the latter condition and 
point  to  estimates  showing  that  the  likelihood  of  civil  war  can  be  better  predicted  with  the 
polarization measure. Alesina et al. (2002) point out that the two measures are highly correlated and 
that in explaining both growth and the quality of institutions, the fractionalization measure works 
slightly better than the polarization index. Our results do, however, not support that statement. 
3  Based on religious polarization, the correlation is 0.371 which is significant on the one percent 
level. 
4  Based on the polarization data by Montalvo and Reynal Querol  (2005) the correlation is 0.2999 
which is significant on the one percent level.   18 
Putnam (1993) claims that Italian regions characterized by a large number of voluntary 
associations having a horizontal organization structure are successful in the production 
of high-quality local public goods. He further argues that the Catholic Church has a 
vertical organization structure. La Porta et al. (1997) asked whether this result could be 
generalized and, additionally, classified Islam and the various Orthodox churches as 
having hierarchical structures. They find (1997, 336f.) that holding per capita income 
constant,  ―countries  with  more  dominant  hierarchical  religions  have  less  efficient 
judiciaries, greater corruption, lower-quality bureaucracies, higher rates of tax evasion, 
lower rates of participation  in  civic activities and professional  associations,  a lower 
level of importance of large firms in the economy, inferior infrastructures, and higher 
inflation.‖ 
Thus,  if  membership  in  a  particular  religion  is  related  to  information  regarding  a 
propensity  to  accept  vertical  structures  of  authority,  such  might  be  reflected  in  a 
country’s  constitutional  structure.  We  would  expect  countries  whose  predominant 
religion is deemed to have a vertical hierarchy to implement constitutions with fewer 
safeguards for JI, interpreting judicial independence as a type of horizontal control, in 
other words, a type of control somewhat antithetical to members of vertical hierarchy 
religions. 
This hypothesis is different from the one on religious fractionalization discussed above 
because it focuses on the beliefs and the structures of specific religions rather than on 
the number of competing beliefs in a country. We differentiate our sample countries on 
the basis of their share of Catholics, Muslims, Protestants,  and other religions.  The 
correlation coefficients with JI as appearing in the original constitution are 0.08, 0.26, –
0.52, and 0.03, respectively. Thus, societies with a large share of Catholics, Muslims 
and/or  other  religions  exhibit  a  greater  probability  of  implementing  JI  in  their 
constitutions,  whereas  those  containing  a  relatively  large  share  of  Protestants  are 
characterized  by  a  lower  probability  of  doing  so.  Statistically,  only  the  positive 
association  between  JI  and  Muslims  and  the  negative  association  between  JI  and 
Protestants are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
With  respect  to  the  probability  of  constitutional  amendments  involving  JI,  we  find 
correlation  coefficients  of  0.10,  -0.09,  –0.10,  and  0.03  for  the  respective  shares  of 
Catholics, Muslims, Protestants, and other religions, none of which are significant. 
4.2.3 Constitutional Context 
A constitution will most likely be the result of compromise. The choice of variables 
underlying our indicator for JI is therefore part of a larger legal context that includes 
other vital aspects of the constitution. It is beyond the scope of this paper to thoroughly   19 
analyze the bargaining dynamics that led to the observed constitution, but to generate at 
least some preliminary insights, we study whether there exist systematic correlations 
between JI and other features of the constitution. We discuss five such features, namely: 
(1) the electoral formula, (2) the form of government, (3) the vertical structure of the 
state (unitary vs. federal), (4) the opportunity for citizens to intervene directly, and (5) 
the length of the entire constitution. 
1 Electoral Formula 
We distinguish  between proportional  representation and majority rule.  The electoral 
formula has substantial consequences for the party system as well as for the type of 
government that will result. Majority rule tends to produce two-party systems, which 
lead to one-party governments. Change of government in majority rule systems is often 
connected with substantial policy changes. If many of the representatives are risk averse 
and therefore have a preference for limiting the amplitude of such policy swings, an 
independent  judiciary  could  be  perceived  as  a  force  for  smoothing  adjustment  in 
legislation after the election. We thus hypothesize that JI should be higher in systems 
with majority rule. 
We use data collected by Golder (2005) to study the relationship between electoral rule 
and the degree of constitutional safeguards for JI.5 In Table 10, we provide absolute and 
relative  frequencies  for  the  cross -tabulation  of  electoral  rule  and  constitutionally 
safeguarded JI. 
Table 10: Electoral Rule and Declarations of JI in Constitution 
























Note: Testing actual vs. expected frequencies: Pearson Chi
2(3) = 11.1 [marginal level of significance: 
0.011]. 
We find that a majoritarian voting system is the most preferred type of electoral rule in 
our sample. However, fewer than expected countries characterized by this rule have JI 
implemented in their constitutions. In contrast, countries that have adopted a multi-tier 
                                                 
5  We use the observations corresponding to the starting year of the relevant constitution in our 
sample. If there is a missing value, we extend the period by up to five years if there is no change in 
the coding so as to conserve degrees of freedom. Moreover, if the particular year is characterized by 
an  outlier  in  terms  of  the  typical  system  implemented  during  a  five-year  period,  the  more 
representatively typical coding was used instead. Even so, the number of observations declines to 
47.   20 
or mixed system are more likely to have a constitutional reference to JI. Countries with 
proportional representation, the second most popular electoral rule, are equally divided 
between having JI in their constitution and not. The statistical test shows that we can 
reject a random distribution of these two variables at the 10% level. Our correlation 
coefficients show that there is a significantly negative association between majoritarian 
electoral rules and JI in the constitution (–0.33), which is significant at a 5% level of 
significance  and  a  positive  association  between  a  multi-tier  system  and  JI  in  the 
constitution (0.38), which is significant at a 1% level. It thus seems that constitutional 
assemblies  choosing  first-past-the-post  do  not  choose  JI  as  a  means  to  reduce  the 
amplitude of policy swings. None of the other voting systems are significant. If we 
combine multi-tier and mixed systems into one category, we find a highly significant 
correlation coefficient of 0.47 at a 1% level. Thus, countries with these electoral rules 
have a greater probability of implementing constitutionally safeguarded JI. 
In Table 11, we record the cross-tabulation with respect to those countries that made 
constitutional changes in JI. 
Table 11: Electoral Rules and Changes in the Declaration of JI in the Constitution 
























Note: Testing actual vs. expected frequencies: Pearson Chi
2(3) = 1.5 [marginal level of significance: 
0.692]. 
We  find  that  none  of  the  countries  with  a  mixed  electoral  rule  changed  their 
constitutions with respect to JI. There are no significant correlations for any electoral 
rule and the probability of a change in the constitution. 
2 Form of Government 
Again,  we  distinguish  between  only  two  types  of  government:  parliamentary  and 
presidential systems. It is argued (e.g., Persson and Tabellini 2003) that presidential 
systems  systematically  achieve  a  higher  degree  of  separation  of  powers  than 
parliamentary systems because the executive is more independent from parliament in 
presidential  systems.6  However,  such  systems  could  give  rise  to  serious  conflicts 
between parliament and president and thus a strong—and independent—judiciary could 
be instrumental in securing stability of the political system. 
                                                 
6  For a critique of that view, see Hayo & Voigt (2010).   21 
To  analyze  the  relationship  between  the  form  of  government  and  constitutionally 
safeguarded JI, we rely on data measuring the degree of parliamentary responsibility 
collected by Banks (2004). He refers to the degree to which a premier must depend on 
the support of a majority in the lower house of a legislature in order to remain in office 
and  distinguishes  four  forms  of  government:  (i)  office  of  premier  does  not  exist 
(irrelevant),  (ii)  office  exists,  but  there  is  no  parliamentary  responsibility,  (iii)  the 
premier is to a certain extent constitutionally and effectively dependent on a legislative 
majority,  and  (iv)  the  premier  is  constitutionally  and  effectively  dependent  on  a 
legislative  majority.7  Table  12  contains  the  result  of  cross -tabulating  form  of 
government with our primary variable of interest; the results are significant. 
Table 12: Form of Government and Declarations of JI in the Constitution 































Note: Testing actual vs. expected frequencies: Pearson Chi
2(3) = 15.3 [marginal level of significance: 
0.002]. 
On the one hand, in countries where the office of premier does not exist or where there 
is no parliamentary responsibility, we typically find explicit constitutional declarations 
of JI. On the other hand, states characterized by full parliamentary responsibility are 
close to equally divided between those that implement JI in the constitution and those 
that  do  not.  Forms  of  government  with  no  parliamentary  responsibility,  typically 
presidential regimes, are certain to have concrete references to JI in their constitutions. 
Countries  in  which  governments  are  fully  responsible  to  parliament  have  a  lower 
probability of implementing constitutional safeguards for JI. The correlation between 
declarations of JI and no parliamentary responsibility is 0.27, which is significant at a 
5% level, whereas the one between JI and full parliamentary responsibility is –0.40, 
significant at all plausible levels of significance. Thus, parliamentary democracies tend 
to  have  less,  and  presidential  democracies  more,  constitutional  safeguarding  of  JI. 
Provided that presidential systems really have a higher degree of separation of powers, a 
formally  independent  judiciary  is  assigned  the  task  of  arbitrator  should  the  other 
branches find themselves in conflict. 
In Table 13, we investigate whether constitutional change with regard to JI is associated 
with form of government. 
 
                                                 
7  Footnote 3 applies here as well, except that the number of observations is 63.   22 
Table 13: Form of Government and Changes in the Declaration of JI in the Constitution 






























Note: Testing actual vs. expected frequencies: Pearson Chi
2(3) = 1.2 [marginal level of significance: 
0.764]. 
As  Table  13  reveals,  JI-related  constitutional  change  occurs  most  often  in  those 
countries where the relationship between government and parliament is irrelevant. Since 
the expected frequencies of occurrence are quite close to the actual ones, there is no 
statistical reason to suspect a nonrandom association between the two variables. Hence, 
constitutional change involving JI is not related to a country’s form of government. 
3 Vertical Structure of State 
We distinguish between federal and unitary states. It can be argued that one important 
function of an independent judiciary is to lessen conflict between the various branches 
of government. In the absence of an impartial arbiter, conflicts between government 
branches  are more likely to  develop  into power games,  with  adverse effects  on the 
country’s  political  stability.  We  conjecture  that  the  potential  for  conflict  between 
political  actors  is  higher  in  federally  organized  states  because  there  are  more 
constitutional actors. Thus, members of the constitutional convention in federal states 
would prefer a higher level of de jure JI than would those in unitary states. Our data 
show, however, that neither the original constitutional choice nor the changes over time 
are correlated with a dummy variable for federalism. 
4 Possibility of Citizens to Intervene Directly 
We distinguish between two direct democratic instruments here, namely iniatives that 
can be initiated by the citizens and referendums that can be initiated by government. 
One can think of them as direct democracy ―from below‖ vs. ―from above‖. Initiatives 
can be interpreted as one way of the principal (the citizens at large) to directly control 
its agent (the government). One can also interpret direct democratic institutions as a 
broader separation of powers, as one more veto player becomes relevant. At least two 
conjectures  regarding  the  relationship  between  judicial  independence  and  initiatives 
come  to  mind:  First,  if  direct  democratic  institutions  exist,  judicial  independence 
becomes all the more important as more conflicts are likely due to the existence of an 
additional  player.  But  it  could  secondly  also  be  the  case  that  the  citizens  at  large 
function  as  the  highest  court  of  the  country  –  and  formally  granted  judicial 
independence becomes not only less needed but also less likely to be included in the   23 
constitution.  Referendums  are  initiated  from  above.  Conjectures  regarding  their 
relationship with JI are even more muddy: If they can be initiated from above they 
would  not  seem  to  constitute  an  additional  constraint  and  their  relationship  with  JI 
remains to be empirically ascertained. 
Our data regarding direct democratic institutions are from Elkins et al. (2008). We only 
consider countries that have not experienced any changes in these variables during our 
observation period. It is interesting to note that initiatives and referendums are highly 
significantly correlated but that the correlation coefficient still is only 0.325 (which is, 
however, significant on the 1% level). Constitutionally safeguarded JI and initiatives are 
significantly  positively  correlated  (almost  on  the  1%  level,  r=0.294).  This  can  be 
interpreted  as  evidence  in  favour  of  a  complementary,  rather  than  a  substitutive 
relationship, of these two institutions. An even closer correlation exists between JI and 
referendums:  the  partial  correlation  is  .312  and  this  is  significant  on  the  1%  level. 
Constitutional  changes  are  not  significant  with  regard  to  either  initiatives  or 
referendums. 
5. Length of Entire Constitution 
Constitutions  are  by  necessity  incomplete  contracts.  Short  constitutions  leave  many 
questions open, leading to an increased demand for legal interpretation by the judiciary.8 
Rational constitution-makers aware of this will thus explicitly endow the judiciary with 
sufficient power to make the constitution internally consistent. Lengthy constitutions 
may be the result of attempts to be as comprehensive as possible on as  many issues as 
possible. Such can be interpreted as a device for reducing uncertainty as detailed 
regulations in the constitution are assumed to decrease uncertainty more than giving 
courts decision and interpretation powers. Therefore, we expect longer co nstitutions to 
be correlated with lower degrees of JI. We find, however, that the original inclusion of 
JI in the constitution is virtually uncorrelated with the length of the document. But there 
is a significant correlation (on the 10% level) between cons titutional changes in JI and 
the length of a constitution. 
4.2.4 Organizational Structure of the Judiciary 
An aspect related to legal origin is the underlying court model. There are various ways 
of designing constitutional review. (i) Review power can be allocated to each and every 
court of the country, as in the United States, which does not have a specialized court. 
This system implies that constitutional review is a posteriori, and uniformity is secured 
                                                 
8  For an analysis of the determinants of constitutional length, Voigt (2009).   24 
by the highest court of the country (in the United States, the Supreme Court). (ii) The 
Austrian model, as proposed by Kelsen (1920), which is characterized by a specialized 
constitutional  court  dealing  with  constitutional  matters.  This  design  can  entail  both 
abstract and concrete review, as well as ex ante and ex post review. (iii) The French 
model, where constitutional matters are relegated to a special body (e.g., the Conseil 
Constitutionnel in France) traditionally constrained to ex ante review (Harutyunayn and 
Mavcic 1999). Most, but not all, constitutional systems can be grouped into one of these 
three designs. Additionally, Harutyanayn and Mavcic (1999) define a ―New (British) 
Commonwealth  Model‖  implemented  by  Mauritius,  and  a  ―Mixed  (American 
Continental) Model,‖ which can be found in a number of states, including Portugal, 
Columbia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Peru.9 
The cross-tabulation between implementation of JI in the original constitution and court 
model in Table 14 shows that all mixed-type and French-type models include a relevant 
passage,  and  so  do  a  majority  of  countries  adhering  to  the  Austrian/Continental-
European and U.S. types of court model. There is a positive correlation between the 
Austrian/Continental-European type of court model and the implementation of judicial 
independence  (0.29),  which  is  significant  at  a  5%  level.  The  negative  correlation 
between the U.S. court model and judicial independence (-0.39) is significant at all 
plausible levels of significance. 
Table 14: Court Model and Declarations of JI in Constitution 
  U.S.  Austrian/Continental-European  Mixed  French  




















Note: Testing actual vs. expected frequencies: Pearson Chi
2(3) = 12.0 [marginal level of significance: 
0.007]. 
However, this finding does not hold when we investigate the association between court 
model and constitutional amendments regarding JI. In Table 15, we report the cross-
tabulation between these two variables. 
Table 15: Court Model and Changes in the Declaration of JI in the Constitution 
  U.S.  Austrian/Continental-European  Mixed  French  




















Note: Testing actual vs. expected frequencies: Pearson Chi
2(3) = 15.8 [marginal level of significance: 
0.001]. 
                                                 
9 We have information on court model for 76 of the countries in our sample.   25 
There is a statistically significant association between the likelihood of a constitutional 
amendment and the type of court model. In particular, mixed-type court models have a 
much greater likelihood of constitutional change. The correlation coefficient between 
mixed-type court models and constitutional amendment is 0.42, which is significant at 
all reasonable levels of significance. Thus, it appears that mixed-type court models are 
less stable judicially than are the ―pure‖ forms of court model. 
4.2.5 Inequality 
Fractionalization  (and  polarization)  is  not  confined  to  ethnic,  linguistic,  or  religious 
dimensions. Keefer and Knack (2002) study inequality in income as well as in land 
ownership and find that high degrees of inequality are inimical to secure property rights. 
In a country with a general franchise and a high degree of inequality, elections can be 
won by promising redistribution to the poor. Under such circumstances, rich citizens 
could make consent to the constitution conditional on a high degree of JI if doing so 
promises to make their earnings more secure. 
Vanhanen (1997) presents a number of proxy variables for the distribution of resources 
within  societies.  In  our  analysis,  we  draw  on  several  indicators.  For  democratic 
competition and participation, competition is operationalized by the percentage of votes 
that are not cast for the largest party and participation is measured by the percentage of 
the population that actually voted in the last  election.10 The correlation between JI-
related declarations in the constitution and this indicator is –0.58, which is significant at 
the 1% level. Thus, countries characterized by more democratization are less likely to 
include explicit provisions on JI in their constitutions. 
Share of family farms counts the area of family farms as a percentage of total farmland. 
Although perhaps less relevant for industrial countries, it is an appropriate indicator for 
the  distribution  of  resources  in  many  less  developed  countries.  The  correlation 
coefficient  with  JI  is  –0.34,  which  is  significant  at  a  5%  level.11  However, when 
differentiating the sample between Western and non -Western countries, we obtain 
correlations of –0.53 and 0.23, respectively. Hence, it is those Western countries where 
the area of family farms as a percentage of total cultivated area is particularly high that 
are less likely to implement constitutional safeguards for JI. 
Knowledge distribution measures how available knowledge resources are to members of 
the society. It is based on the arithmetic mean of the percentage of students and the 
                                                 
10  The correlation coefficient is based on 35 observations. 
11  The correlation coefficient is based on 32 observations.   26 
percentage of literate in a country. Countries with a wider distribution of education are 
less likely to feature declarations on JI in their constitutions (correlation coefficient: –
0.50, significant at a 1% level).12 
Finally,  urban  influence  is  the  arithmetic  mean  of  the  percentage  share  of  urban 
dwellers  to  total  population  and  the  percentage  of  Non-Agricultural  Population.  It 
proxies  for  the  relative  importance  of  city  versus  rural  dwellers  in  a  country.  The 
correlation with JI is –0.55, which is statistically significant at a 1% level.13 Thus, when 
many citizens live in urban areas and are engaged in nonagricul tural work, it is less 
likely that JI will be explicitly mentioned in the constitution. 
Concerning the likelihood of constitutional change with regard to JI, we find that such is 
negatively associated with the degree of  democratic  competition  and  participation 
(correlation coefficient: –0.14) but not significantly so. A similar conclusion applies to 
share  of  family  farms  (correlation  coefficient:  –0.03),  knowledge  distribution 
(correlation  coefficient:  –0.18),  and  urban  influence  (correlation  coefficient:  –0.18). 
Hence, the distribution of these resources has very little impact on the likelihood of 
constitutional amendments regarding the way JI is safeguarded in the constitution. The 
distribution  of  resources  is  associated  with  the  initial  specification  of  JI  in  the 
constitution, but not with any changes over time. 
5. Conclusion and Outlook 
Over the last 10 years, research into the effects and causes of judicial independence (JI) 
has  made  important  progress  and  we  have  also  gained  substantial  insight  into  the 
economic effects of constitutions. These two fields of study are combined in this paper. 
We  created  a  panel  dataset  containing  23  variables  regarding  constitutionally 
safeguarded JI. 
In this paper, we confine ourselves to describing and analyzing only one of these 23 
variables—whether  the  independence  of  judicial  organs  is  explicitly  mentioned  in 
constitutions. Our key findings are as follows. First, legal origins do have an impact on 
the likelihood of explicitly anchoring JI in the constitution: countries belonging to the 
common law tradition are less likely to implement JI in their constitutions (and those 
with a socialist tradition are more likely to do so). Correspondingly, former British 
colonies are less likely to address JI explicitly, as are states in the Caribbean. Second, 
religion has a significant impact on whether JI is included in a country’s constitution: 
                                                 
12   The correlation coefficient is based on 32 observations. 
13   The correlation coefficient is based on 32 observations.   27 
societies with a high degree of religious fractionalization are not only less likely to 
anchor JI in their constitutions, but also less likely to change their constitutions to do so 
later on. Finally, Muslim countries are more likely to mention JI in their constitutions, 
whereas Protestant countries are less likely to do so. Third, the distribution of resources 
within a society is important: a higher percentage of family farms, a wider distribution 
of education, and higher percentage of urban dwellers are all connected with a lower 
likelihood mentioning JI in the constitution. However, in the case of family farms and 
knowledge distribution, it is primarily Western countries that are responsible for the 
result and for democratic competition and participation, it is other countries. Only the 
negative  impact  of  a  more  urban  environment  on  constitutionally  safeguarded  JI  is 
found globally. 
We  next  intend  to  analyze  the  other  22  variables.  Then,  we  will  embark  on  an 
exploration  of  the  determinants  of  constitutionally  safeguarded  JI  and  thus  make  a 
contribution to the newly emerging research field of endogenous constitutions. 
     28 
References 
Alesina, A., A. Devleeschauwer, W. Easterly, S. Kurlat, and R. Wacziarg (2003); Fractionalization, Journal of 
Economic Growth 8(2):155-94. 
Banks, A. S. (2004); Banks’ Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive; distributed by Databanks International, 
Binghamton, NY. 
Burbank, St. and B. Friedman (2002); Reconsidering Judicial Independence, in: St. Burbank and B. Friedman 
(eds.): Judicial Independence at the Crossroads—An Interdisciplinary Approach. Thousand Oaks: Sage, pp. 9–42. 
Elazar, D. J. (1995); From Statism to Federalism: A Paradigm Shift, Publius 25(2):5-18. 
Elkins,  Z.,  T.  Ginsburg,  and  J.  Mellon  (2009);  The  Comparative  Constitutions  Project.  Available  at: 
http://www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/ 
Feld, L. P. and S. Voigt (2003); Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross-Country Evidence 
Using a New Set of Indicators, European Journal of Political Economy 19(3):497–527. 
Ginsburg, T. (2002); Economic Analysis and the Design of Constitutional Courts, Theoretical Inquiries in Law 
3(1):49–85. 
Ginsburg, T. (2008); The Global Spread of Constitutional Review, in: K. Whittington and D. Keleman (eds.): 
Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics, Oxford et al.: Oxford University Press. 
Golder, M. (2005); Democratic electoral systems around the world, 1946-2000, Electoral Studies 24(1):103-21 
Harutyunyan,  G.  and  A.  Mavcic  (1999);  Constitutional  Review  and  Its  Development  in  the  Modern  World  (A 
Comparative Constitutional Analysis), Yerevan and Ljubljana. 
Hayo,  B.  and  S.  Voigt  (2007);  Explaining  de  Facto  Judicial  Independence,  International  Review  of  Law  and 
Economics 27:269–90. 
Hayo, B. and S. Voigt (2010); Determinants of Constitutional Change: Why Do Countries Change Their 
Form of Government? Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1562553 
Jennings Peretti, T. (2002); Does Judicial Independence Exist? The Lessons of Social Science Research, in: St. 
Burbank and B. Friedman (eds.): Judicial Independence at the Crossroads—An Interdisciplinary Approach. Thousand 
Oaks: Sage, pp. 103–33. 
Keefer, Ph. and S. Knack (2002); Polarization, Politics and Property Rights: Links Between Inequality and 
Growth, Public Choice 111(1-2):127–54. 
La Porta, R., F. López-de-Silanes, Chr. Pop-Eleches, and A. Shleifer (2004); Judicial Checks and Balances, 
Journal of Political Economy 112(2):445-70. 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny (1997); Legal Determinants of External Finance, 
Journal of Finance 52(3):1131-50. 
La  Porta,  R.,  F.  Lopez-de-Silanes  and  A.  Shleifer  (1998);  Law  and  Finance,  Journal  of  Political  Economy 
106(6):1113-55. 
La Porta, R., F. López-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny (1999); The Quality of Government, Journal of 
Law, Economics and Organization 15(1): 222–79. 
Montalvo, J. G. And M. Reynal-Querol (2005); Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars, The 
American Economic Review 95(3):796-816.   29 
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2003); The Economic Effects of Constitutions: What Do the Data Say? Cambridge: MIT 
Press. 
Putnam, R. (1993); Making Democracy Work, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Teorell, J. and A. Hadenius (2007); Determinants of democratization: taking stock of the large-n evidence, in: 
D. Berg-Schlosser (ed.): Democratization: the state of the art. Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 69-95. 
Vanhanen, T. (2003); Democratization and Power Resources 1850-2000, FSD1216, version 1.0, Tampere: 
Finnish Social Science Data Archive 
Voigt, S. (2009); Explaining Constitutional Garrulity, International Review of Law and Economics 29(4):290-303. 
Voigt, S., M. Ebeling and L. Blume (2007); Improving Credibility by Delegating Judicial Competence – the 
Case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Journal of Development Economics 82(2):348-73.  
Appendix: Definition of Variables 
AL_ETHNIC: 
Reflects probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethno linguistic group. 
The  higher  the  number,  the  more  fractionalized  society.  The  definition  of  ethnicity  involves  a  combination  of  racial  and 
linguistic characteristics. The result is a higher degree of fractionalization than the commonly used ELF-index (see el_elf60) in 
for ex-ample Latin America, where people of many races speak the same language; source: Alesina et al. (2003). 
AL_LANGUAGE: 
Reflects probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same linguistic group. The 
higher the number, the more fractionalized society; source: Alesina et al. (2003). 
AL_RELIGION: 
Reflects probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same religious group. The 
higher the number, the more fractionalized society; source: Alesina et al. (2003). 
BANKS_S21F7 
Refers to the degree to which a premier must depend on the support of a majority in the lower house of a legislature in order to 
remain  in  office.  0:  Irrelevant.  Office  of  premier  does  not  exist,  1:  Absent.  Office  exists,  but  there  is  no  parliamentary 
responsibility., 2: Incomplete. The premier is, at least to some extent, constitutionally responsible to the legislature. Effective 
responsibility is, however, limited, 3: Complete. The premier is constitutionally and effectively dependent upon a legislative 
majority for continuance in office; source: Banks (2004). 
CHALLEG: 
Who  has  standing  to  initiate  challenge  to  the  constitutionality  of  legislation?  1:  Head  of  State  (use this choice  for  single 
executive  systems),  2:  Head  of  Government,  3:  First  (or  only)  Chamber  of  the  Legislature,  4:  Second  Chamber  of  the 
Legislature, 5: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required, 6:  Lawyers, 7: Public (by complaint), 8: The Courts, 9: Left 
explicitly to non constitutional law, 25: The Government/Cabinet; source: own research based on Elkins et al. (2009). 
CHALSTAG: 
At what stage of the legislative process can bills be reviewed for constitutionality? 1: Pre promulgation, 2:  Post promulgation, 3: 
Either, 4: Left explicitly to non constitutional law; source: own research based on Elkins et al. (2009). 
CHALUNCN: 
What is the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality? 1: Law is void, 2: Void for specific case, but law still exists, 3: 
Returned to legislature for revision/reconsideration, 4: Left explicitly to non constitutional law; source: own research based on 
Elkins et al. (2009). 
CHFRES: 
What additional restrictions does the constitution place on the eligibility to serve as the Chief Justice of the Highest Ordinary 
Court? 1: Must be from a particular party, 2: Must be a particular gender, 3: Membership or position as minister of particular 
religious denomination, 4: Must have a particular linguistic/national/racial identity, 5: Must be a citizen, 6: Must be a native 
citizen, 7: Must have certain education, 8: Must be a non felon, 9: Must be a lawyer, 65: Must be a national, Left explicitly to 
non constitutional law; source: own research based on Elkins et al. (2009).   30 
CHFTERM: 
What is the maximum term length for the Chief Justice of the Highest Ordinary Court? Source: own research based on Elkins et 
al. (2009). 
CHFTRMNM: 
What restrictions are in place regarding the number of terms for the Chief Justice of the Highest Ordinary Court? 1: Only one 
term permitted, total, 2: Only two terms permitted, total, 3: No successive terms permitted, but multiple non successive terms 
permitted, 4: Only two successive terms permitted, but multiple non successive terms permitted, 5: No term limits, 6: left 
explicitly to non constitutional law; source: own research based on Elkins et al. (2009). 
CHIEFAP: 
Who is involved in the approval of nominations for the Chief Justice of the Highest Ordinary Court? 1: Head of State (use this 
choice for single executive systems), 2: Head of Government, 3: the Government/Cabinet, 4: First (or only) Chamber of the 
Legislature,  5:  Second  Chamber  of  the  Legislature,  6:  Judicial  Council/Commission,  7:  Judiciary  (other  than  judicial 
council/commission), 8: left explicitly to non constitutional law; source: own research based on Elkins et al. (2009). 
CHIEFNOM: 
Who is involved in the nomination of the Chief Justice of the Highest Ordinary Court? 1: Head of State (use this choice for 
single executive systems), 2: Head of Government, 3: the Government/Cabinet, 4: First (or only) Chamber of the Legislature, 5: 
Second Chamber of the Legislature, 6: Judicial Council/Commission, 7: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission), 8: 
other, please specify in the comments section, 79: left explicitly to non constitutional law; source: own research based on Elkins 
et al. (2009). 
CONLENGTH: 
The length of the current constitution of a state in words; schedules and other complementary documents are not counted; 
source: Voigt (2009). 
COURTMODEL: 
Organizational structure of  the court system: 0: US, 1: Austrian, 2: Mixed, 3: French; source: Harutyunyan and Mavcic (1999). 
FEDERALISM: 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a country has a federal political structure, 0 otherwise; source: Elazar (1995). 
GOL_EST: 
Variable indicating the type of electoral system used: 1: Majoritarian (employs plurality, absolute majority, qualified majority, 
limited vote, alternative vote, single non-transferable vote or modified Borda count in a single electoral tier), 2: Proportional 
(employs party list or single transferable vote in a single electoral tier), 3: Multi-tier (employs a single electoral formula, 
majoritarian or proportional, across multiple tiers), 4: Mixed (employs a mixture of majoritarian and proportional electoral rules 
in one or more electoral tiers); source: Golder (2005). 
HOCCJ: 
Is the selection process specified for the chief justice or the other justices of the Highest Ordinary Court? 1: Chief Justice only, 
2: Regular Justices only, 3: Both with same procedure, 4: Both with different procedures for each, 5: Neither; source: own 
research based on Elkins et al. (2009). 
HOCOP: 
Does the constitution provide for judicial opinions of the Highest Ordinary Court? 1: Yes, 2: No; source: own research based on 
Elkins et al. (2009). 
HOCOPW: 
Which of the following is mentioned about opinions for the Highest Ordinary Court? 1: Reasons are required in court decisions, 
2:  Separate  or  concurring  opinions are  allowed,  3:  Separate  or  concurring  opinions  is  explicitly  prohibited,  4:  Dissenting 
opinions are allowed, 5: Dissenting opinions are explicitly prohibited; source: own research based on Elkins et al. (2009). 
HT_COLONIAL: 
This is a tenfold classification of the former colonial ruler of the country. Following Australia, Israel and New Zealand), and 
exclusively focused on "Western overseas" colonialism. This implies that only Western colonizers (e.g. excluding Japanese 
colonialism), and only countries located in the non-Western hemisphere "overseas" (e.g. excluding Ireland & Malta), have been 
coded. Each country that has been colonized since 1700 is coded. In cases of several colonial powers, the last one is counted, if it 
lasted for 10 years or longer. The categories are the following: 0: Never colonized by a Western overseas colonial power, 1: 
Dutch, 2: Spanish, 3: Italian, 4: US, 5: British, 6: French, 7: Portuguese, 8 Belgian, 9 British-French, 10 Australian; source: 
Teorell and Hadenius (2007). 
HT_REGION:   31 
This is a tenfold politico-geographic classification of world regions, based on a mixture of two considerations: geographical 
proximity (with the partial exception of category 5 below) and demarcation by area specialists having contributed to a regional 
understanding of democratization. The categories are as follow: 1: Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union (including Central 
Asia), 2: Latin America (including Cuba, Haiti & the Dominican Republic), 3: North Africa & the Middle East (including Israel, 
Turkey & Cyprus), 4: Sub-Saharan Africa, 5: Western Europe and North America (including Australia &New Zealand), 6: East 
Asia (including Japan & Mongolia), 7: South-East Asia, 8: South Asia, 9: The Pacific (excluding Australia & New Zealand), 10: 
The Caribbean (including Belize, Guyana & Suriname, but excluding Cuba, Haiti & the Dominican Republic); source: Teorell 
and Hadenius (2007). 
INITIAT: 
Does the constitution provide for the ability of individuals to propose legislative initiatives (referenda from below)? 1: Yes, 2: 
No; source: own research based on Elkins et al. (2009). 
INTERP: 
To whom does the constitution assign the responsibility for the interpretation of the constitution? 1: Any Ordinary Court, 2: 
Constitutional Court/Council, 3: Supreme Court Only, 4: Special chamber of the Supreme Court, 5: First (or only) Chamber of 
the Legislature, 6: Second Chamber of the Legislature, 7: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required, 8: Left explicitly to 
non constitutional law; source: own research based on Elkins et al. (2009). 
JREM: 
Are there provisions for dismissing judges? 1: Yes, 2: No; source: own research based on Elkins et al. (2009). 
JREMCON: 
Under what conditions can judges be dismissed? 1: General dissatisfaction (i e dismissal is fairly unrestricted), 2: Crimes and 
other issues of conduct, 3: Treason, 4: Violations of the constitution, 5: Incapacitated, 6: Left explicitly to non constitutional law; 
source: own research based on Elkins et al. (2009). 
JREMPRO: 
Who  can  propose  the  dismissal  of  judges?  1:  Head  of  State  (use  this  choice  for  single  executive  systems),  2:  Head  of 
Government, 3: First (or only) Chamber of the Legislature, 4: Second Chamber of the Legislature, 5: Both Chambers of the 
Legislature are required, 6: Public Prosecutor, 7: Judicial Council, 8: Public, 9: Left explicitly to non constitutional law, 25: The 
Government/Cabinet; source: own research based on Elkins et al. (2009). 
JUDIND: 
Does the constitution contain an explicit declaration regarding the independence of the central judicial organ(s)? 1: Yes, 2: No; 
source: own research based on Elkins et al. (2009). 
JUDSAL: 
Does the constitution explicitly state that judicial salaries are protected from governmental intervention? 1: Yes, 2: No; source: 
own research based on Elkins et al. (2009). 
LANDLOCKED: 
1:  Country  is  enclosed  or  nearly  enclosed  by  land,  0:  Country  is  not  enclosed  or  nearly  enclosed  by  land;  source: 
www.wikipedia.org. 
LP_CATHO80: 
Catholics as percentage of population in 1980; source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
LP_LAT_ABST: 
The absolute value of the latitude of the capital city, divided by 90 (to take values between 0 and 1); source: La Porta et al. 
(1999). 
LP_LEGOR: 
Identifies the legal origin of the Company Law or Commercial code of each country. There are five possible origins: 1: English 
Common Law, 2: French Commercial Code, 3: Socialist/Communist Laws, 4: German Commercial Code, 5: Scandinavian 
Commercial Code; source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
LP_MUSLIM80: 
Muslims as percentage of population in 1980; source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
LP_NO_CPM80: 
Percentage  of  population  belonging  to  other  de-nominations  in  1980.  Defined  as  100  –  lp_catho80  –  lp_muslim80  – 
lp_protmg80; source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
LP_PROTMG80:   32 
Protestants as percentage of population in 1980; source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
REFEREN: 
Does the constitution provide for the ability to propose a referendum (or plebiscite)? 1: Yes, 2: No; source: own research based 
on Elkins et al. (2009). 
REY_ETHFRAC: 
Index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization calculated using the data of the World Christian Encyclopedia; source: Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol (2005). 
REY_ETHPOL: 
Index of ethnolinguistic polarization calculated using the data of the World Christian Encyclopedia; source: Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol (2005). 
REY_RELPOL: 
Index of religious polarization calculated using L’Etat des Religions dans le Monde and The Statesmen Yearbook; source: 
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005). 
REY_RELFRAC: 
Index of religious fractionalization calculated using L’Etat des Religions dans le Monde and The Statesmen Yearbook; source: 
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005).. 
SUPAP: 
Who is involved in the approval of nominations to the highest ordinary court? 1: Head of State (use this choice for single 
executive  systems),  2:  Head  of  Government,  3:  First  (or  only)  Chamber  of  the  Legislature,  4:  Second  Chamber  of  the 
Legislature, 5: Judicial Council/Commission, 6: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission), 7: Left explicitly to non 
constitutional law, 25: The Government/Cabinet; source: own research based on Elkins et al. (2009). 
SUPNOM: 
Who is involved in the nomination of judges to the highest ordinary court? 1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive 
systems), 2: Head of Government, 3: First (or only) Chamber of the Legislature, 4: Second Chamber of the Legislature, 5: 
Judicial Council/Commission, 6: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission), 7: Left explicitly to non constitutional law, 
25: The Government/Cabinet; source: own research based on Elkins et al. (2009). 
SUPPOW: 
What  additional  powers  does  the  highest  ordinary  court  have  besides  reviewing  legislation?  1:  Supervise  elections,  2: 
Impeachment of executive, 3: Counter corruption, 4: Constitutionality of political parties, 5: Review states of emergency, 6: 
Review treaties; source: own research based on Elkins et al. (2009). 
SUPRES: 
What additional restrictions does the constitution place on the eligibility to serve as a member of the highest ordinary court? 1: 
Must be from a particular party, 2: Must be a particular gender, 3: Membership or position as minister of particular religious 
denomination, 4: Must have a particular linguistic/national/racial identity, 5: Must be citizen, 6: Must be a native citizen, 7: Must 
have  certain  education, 8: Must be a non  felon, 9:  Must be  a  lawyer,  65: Must  be a national, 89:  Left  explicitly  to  non 
constitutional law; source: own research based on Elkins et al. (2009). 
SUPTERM: 
What is the maximum term length for judges for the highest ordinary court? Source: own research based on Elkins et al. (2009). 
SUPTERMN: 
What restrictions are in place regarding the number of terms of members of the highest ordinary court may serve? 1: Only one 
term permitted, total, 2: Only two terms permitted, total, 3: No successive terms permitted, but multiple non successive terms 
permitted, 4: Only two successive terms permitted, but multiple non successive terms permitted, 5: No term limits, 6: Left 
explicitly to non constitutional law; source: own research based on Elkins et al. (2009). 
VAN_COMP: 
The competition variable portrays the electoral success of smaller parties, that is, the percentage of votes gained by the smaller 
parties in parliamentary and/or presidential elections. The variable is calculated by subtracting from 100 the percentage of votes 
won by the largest party (the party which wins most votes) in parliamentary elections or by the party of the successful candidate 
in presidential elections. The variable thus theoretically ranges from 0 (only one party received 100 % of votes) to 100 (each 
voter cast a vote for a distinct party); source: Vanhanen (2003). 
VAN_FAMILYF: 
The area of family farms as a percentage of total cultivated area or total area of holdings. Family farms refer to holdings that are   33 
mainly cultivated by the holder family and that are owned by the cultivator family or held in owner-like possession. The upper 
hectare limit and other criteria of family farms vary from country to country and over time. Moreover, the data for the 1980s is 
based on information from 1960-80, and for the 1990s mostly from 1980 but also from the 1970s and the 1960s. In other words, 
comparisons across time and space must be interpreted with great caution; source: Vanhanen (2003). 
VAN_INDEX: 
This index combines two basic dimensions of democracy – competition and participation – measured as the percentage of votes 
not  cast  for  the  largest  party  (Competition)  times  the  percent-age  of  the  population  who  actually  voted  in  the  election 
(Participation). This product is divided by 100 to form an index that in principle could vary from 0 (no democracy) to 100 (full 
democracy). (Empirically, however, the largest value is 49) ; source: Vanhanen (2003). 
VAN_KNOWDIST: 
The arithmetic mean of Students % (van_studentsp) and Literates % (van_literates) ; source: Vanhanen (2003). 
VAN_OCCUP: 
The arithmetic mean of Urban Population % (van_urban) and Non-Agricultural Population % (van_nagric) ; source: Vanhanen 
(2003). 
VAN_PART: 
The percentage of the total population who actually voted in the election; source: Vanhanen (2003). 
VAN_POWRES: 
Measures the level  of dispersion of economic, intellectual, and organizational—or, for short, power—resources in society. 
Computed  as  the  product  of  Index  of  Occupational  Diversification  (van_occup),  Index  of  Knowledge  Distribution 
(van_knowdist) and Index of Distribution of Economic Power Resources (van_distec), divided by 10.000, to range from 0 (low) 
to 100 (high relative distribution of power resources) ; source: Vanhanen (2003). 
VAN_URBAN: 
Urban population as a percentage of total population. Note that comparisons across time and space must be interpreted with 
caution as the concept of urbanity has changed over time and to some ex-tent varies from country to country; source: Vanhanen 
(2003). 
 